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ECONOMIC INFEASIBILITY AND EPA'S 1994 
COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW POLICY: A 
SUCCESSFUL SOLUTION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
STILL LEAVES A TURBID UNDERSTANDING 
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS 
JeJJMann* 
Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs) are the repugnant remnants 
of antiquated technology that plague older cities like Boston and 
threaten precious water resources like the Charles River by in-
troducing raw sewage during wet- weather events. Solving the 
CSO problem means tearing up many of the streets and replacing 
decades-old pipes or boring large underground storage basins to 
contain these flows. The Massachusetts Water Resources Author-
ity (MWRA), the largest supplier of water and sewer services in 
Massachusetts, developed a plan to reduce untreated CSO dis-
charge volumes into Boston Harbor and its tributaries by ninety-
two percent, including treatment of ninety-two percent of all con-
tinuing CSO discharges. This plan came as an alternative to 
spending over $1 billion for a tunneled stormwater collection sys-
tem. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Mas-
sachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) con-
cluded that MWRA's plan was sufficient given that requiring 
these additional measures would have a substantial economic im-
pact on the community. However, these agencies remain at odds 
over how that impact should be calculated-based on a cost-effec-
tiveness analysis or on an ability to pay. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA) provides 
sewer and water services to sixty-one Massachusetts communities, 
serves 2.5 million people and over 5000 businesses, supplies 255 mil-
* Clinical Placement Director and Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AF-
FAIRS LAW REVIEW, 199&-1999. 
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lion gallons of drinking water a day, and treats 370 million gallons of 
sewage.1 
Throughout MWRA's sewage collection system are Combined Sew-
er Systems (CSSS).2 CSSs are wastewater systems that carry sewer 
drainage from commercial and residential sources and collect runoff 
from stormwater and snow-melt events.S Typically, these systems 
transport all of their sewage to a centralized treatment plant, such as 
MWRA's facility at Deer Island.4 These facilities, known as Publicly 
Owned Treatment Works (POTWs),5 are often designed to handle 
tremendous amounts of combined flows, even in wet weather.6 How-
ever, the CSS piping networks are widespread and have not been 
upgraded to match the capacities of the POTWs.7 As a result, areas 
such as eastern Massachusetts that have invested billions of dollars 
in new POTWs still lack adequate sewer piping capacity to transport 
both daily sewage flows and additional flows from wet-weather 
events.S When such overcharge occurs, the systems utilize overflow 
discharge points called Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOS).9 
1 See MWRA, MWRA's Essential Statistics (visited Jan. 31, 1999) <http://www.mwra.com/ 
orglhtmVwhatis.htm>. Treatment quantities represent an average and fluctuate with weather 
and demographic changes. See id. 
2 See MWRA, FINAL COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW FACILITIES PLAN AND ENVIRON-
MENTAL IMPACT REPORT 2-1 (1997) [hereinafter MWRA FEIR]. 
3 See TERENCE J. MCGHEE, WATER SUPPLY AND SEWAGE 266 (6th ed. 1991). 
4 See MWRA, Combined Sewer Overflows (visited Feb. 25, 1999) <http://www.mwra.com/ 
sewerlhtmVsewcso.htm> [hereinafter Combined Sewer OverflOws]. 
5 See 40 C.F.R. § 403.3(0) (1999). 
6 See Kevin B. Smith, Combined Sewer Overjfnws and Sanitary Sewer Overflows: EPA's 
Regulatory Approach and Policy under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 26 Envtl. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,296 (June 1996); see, e.g., MWRA, Deer Island Sewage Treatment Plant 
(visited Feb. 25,1999) <http://www.mwra.com/sewerlhtmVsewditp.htm. 
7 See Northwest Envtl. Assoc. v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 981 (9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 
518 U.S. 1018 (1996). For example, in Portland, Oregon the POTW collection system was 
overcharged with resulting CSOs occurring 50 to 80 times per year. See id. 
S See Discharge Permits: Permit for $3.9 Billion Treatment Plant in Massachusetts Called 
"Toughest" in U.S., 28 Env't Rep. (BN A) 2121 (Feb. 13, 1998) (MWRA's POTW cost $3.9 billion); 
Combined Sewer Overjfnws, supra note 4 (despite increasing the pumping capacity at MWRA's 
POTW, CSOs still continue). U[CSOs] add the final irony to a picture of a shining new technology 
[POTWs] resting proudly at the end of a porous delivery system that spills and leaks on the 
way to the treatment plant." 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AIR AND 
WATER 333-34 (1986) [hereinafter RODGERS 1]. Despite cutting emissions by CSOs in half 
through improvements in primary treatment and collection, the MWRA system still discharged 
over 1.5 billion gallons of CSOs until 1992. See Nancy J. Wheatly, The Regulatory Pendulum: 
Has It Finally Come to Restfor CSO Control?, in NATIONAL WATER RESOURCES REGULA-
TION: WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now? 187, 193-94 (Howard Holme ed., 
1994). 
9 See Combined Sewer Overjfnw (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,688 (1994); 
Combined Sewer Overjluws, supra note 4. 
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CSOs are remnants of obsolete technology that burden older cities 
like Boston and threaten precious water resources like the Charles 
River by introducing raw sewage during wet-weather events. lO Com-
pletely solving the CSO problem would require tearing up many 
streets and replacing decades-old pipes or boring large underground 
storage basins to contain these flows. l1 MWRA, the largest supplier 
of water and sewer services in Massachusetts, developed a plan to re-
duce the volume of untreated CSO discharges into Boston Harbor and 
its tributaries by ninety-two percent, including treatment of ninety-
two percent of all continuing CSO discharges.12 This plan was an al-
ternative to spending over one billion dollars for a tunneled collection 
system.13 EPA and the Massachusetts DEP concluded that MWRA's 
plan was sufficient given that requiring these additional measures 
would have a substantial economic impact on the community.14 How-
ever, these agencies remain at odds over how that impact should be 
calculated-based on a cost-effectiveness analysis or on ability to 
pay. 15 
Since the Clean Water Act (CWA)16 has not directly addressed 
CSOs, EPA issued two policies governing how states should handle 
CSOs in their efforts to meet the federally-mandated water quality 
and technology standards.17 Both EPA's most recent CSO policy and 
the Massachusetts DEP CSO policy-the latter issued in accordance 
with the former-provide a menu of alternatives for regulating CSOs 
to help states attain national and state water quality goals and ad-
dress CSO impacts. IS One such option is an economic standard that 
allows states to change designated uses of a water body to reflect 
wet-weather impacts of CSOs where total elimination would cause 
"substantial and widespread social and economic impacts."19 
This Comment suggests that the standards for showing a change 
in designated use should include an analysis of the cost-effectiveness 
10 See MCGHEE, supra note 3, at 268. 
11 See Smith, supra note 6, at 10,296. 
12 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra note 180 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra note 135 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 179,231-32,240-43 and accompanying text. 
16 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
17 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,688; National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 37,370, 37,371 (1989). 
18 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,688, 18,694-95; MASSACHUSETI'S DEP, POLICY FOR ABATEMENT OF 
POLLUTION FROM COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOW 1 (1997) [hereinafter DEP CSO POLICY]. 
19 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g)(6) (1999); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4)(f) (1998). 
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of abating esos. Cost-effectiveness allows a permittee to avoid costly 
improvements that are unlikely to achieve significant water quality 
benefits. This flexibility frees additional economic resources to ad-
dress non-eSO pollution sources and more efficiently achieves overall 
water quality goals. 
The health and cost challenges of esos are discussed in Section 1. 
A brief explanation of the eWA framework is provided in Section II. 
Section III discusses the integration of esos into the eWA through 
review and permitting under EPA policies. Section IV outlines the 
procedure for changing designated uses of receiving water bodies and 
the options available to EPA and state administrators for continuing 
eso discharges. Section V then traces MWRA's application for eso 
National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits. 
The conclusions and positions of EPA and DEP regarding MWRA's 
showing of economic impact are then detailed in Section VI along with 
their respective conclusions of the required economic standards. Fi-
nally, Section VII discusses the use of a cost-benefit analysis in envi-
ronmental decision making and assesses the benefits of cost-effective-
ness in addressing these concerns. 
1. eso BACKGROUND 
A. What are CSOs? 
esos are byproducts of antiquated engineering and municipal plan-
ning.20 To eliminate street accumulation of sewage, early planners 
combined stormwater collection and sewer transportation.21 However, 
as cities grew, flows of sewage increased and the amount of impervi-
ous areas grew, increasing the loading on these networks.22 Unwilling 
or unable to tear up the streets to replace these outdated pipes, cities 
developed ''blow off points" where the excess pressure head in the 
system could directly discharge into a water body, easing the pres-
sure on the network and preventing a backup of sewage into the 
streets and basements of the communities.23 These discharge events 
are known as esos.24 
20 See McGHEE, supra note 3, at 268. 
21 See id. 
22 See id. 
23 See Smith, supra note 6, at 10,296; see also Northwest Envtl. Assoc. v. City of Portland, 56 
F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 1995). 
24 See generally Smith, supra note 6. 
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Typically, CSOs receive limited treatment and discharge the mixed 
stormwwater and sewage into public water bodies.25 Untreated, they 
can pose unsightly and hazardous threats to the environmental health 
of receiving water bodies.26 CSOs also directly conflict with the goals 
of the CWA.27 
B. Regulatory and Economic Challenges of CSOs 
The economic impact of CSO cleanup on communities is clear and 
predictable: nationwide, CSSs collect the sewage and stormwater in 
950 communities, serving forty million people.28 EPA recently esti-
mated that the cost for CSO cleanups will exceed $40 billion.29 Fur-
thermore, CSOs are essential to the operation of CSS systems and 
cannot be eliminated overnight.30 Without CSOs, large wet-weather 
events would cause raw sewage to backup into basements and 
streets.31 
Finally, because CSO events depend on variable stormwater or 
snowmelt conditions, they elude both quantification and qualification, 
frustrating regulation on a national basis.32 For example, trying to 
prevent all of the CSOs for a given year may require a facility four 
times larger than a facility that collected all but four discharges per 
year.33 Thus, seventy-five percent of the facility's capacity would be 
26 See McGHEE, supra note 3, at 268. 
26 See National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,370, 37,371 (1989) 
("CSOs have been shown to have severe adverse impacts on water quality, aquatic biota, and 
human health under certain conditions."). 
27 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1998). The objective of the CWA is ''to restore and maintain the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters," including a national goal 
"that the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters be eliminated .... " [d. 
28 See Bob Perciasepe, Combined Sewer Overflows: Where are we four years after adoption of 
the CSO Policy?, May 18, 1998, at 1 (visited Jan. 31, 1999) <http://www.epa.gov/OWMlcso.htm>. 
29 See id. at 3. This estimate is a great reduction from earlier estimates that ranged from $80 
to $120 billion. See id. (noting earlier estimate of $120 billion); Environmental Groups Call for 
Efforts to Deal with Combined Sewer Problems, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 13 (May 1, 1992) (esti-
mating improvement costs at $70 to $80 billion); Combined Sewer Overflow Problems Demand 
New Approach, Local Officials Say, 20 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1939 (Apr. 6, 1990) (predicting costs 
as high as $109 billion). 
3{) See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
31 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
32 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,688 (1994); 
MASSACHUSE'ITS DEP, GUIDANCE FOR ABATEMENT OF POLLUTION FROM CSO DISCHARGES 5 
(1997) [hereinafter DEP CSO GUIDANCE]. "Since there is no finite limit to the magnitUde and 
duration of a precipitation event, CSO controls can only lower the probability of untreated 
overflows, not eliminate them entirely." DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra, at 5. 
33 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-71 (estimate based on MWRA data for its Cottage 
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unnecessary to prevent CSOs except for one percent of the time.34 
Therefore, while the CWA calls for the eventual elimination of point 
source discharges,35 EPA recognizes that improvement in discharge 
frequency, quantity, and quality from CSOs must be phased in gradu-
ally on the road to total compliance.36 
II. THE CWA STRUCTURE 
A. History of Federal Clean Water Regulation 
The history of federal water quality management began in earnest 
with the Clean Water Quality Act of 1965 (1965 Act), which com-
manded states to establish, implement, and enforce water quality-
based standards (WQSs) for interstate waters.37 The 1965 Act focused 
on qualitative measures and provided for federal oversight of state 
efforts. as Thus, the 1965 Act marked a tremendous departure from the 
only previous enforceable water control regulation, the Refuse Act of 
1899, which focused not on environmental protection, but on the main-
tenance of navigation under the review of the Army Corp of Engi-
neers.39 
The 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act, and the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act followed the 1965 Act,40 as amended in 1972,41 
Farm CSO Facility, discussed infra notes 206-15, showing elimination would require 8.72 million 
gallons of storage versus the 2.27 million gallons of storage needed to capture the flows of all 
but four storms per year). 
34 See id. Using this same facility, it must be seven times as large as one that prevents all but 
seven events per year-using the additional 85% of its capacity a mere 2% of the year. See id. 
at 25-70, 25-71 (1.3 million gallons of storage is sufficient to prevent CSOs in all but seven 
storms). 
36 See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
36 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,689. 
37 See J. Gordon Arbucklem, Water Pollution Control, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 
151 (12th ed.1993); 2 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw AIR AND WATER 242 (1986) 
[hereinafter RODGERS 2]. 
38 See Columbus and Francis County Metro. Park Dist. v. Shank, 600 N .E.2d 1042, 1062 (Ohio 
1992); SUSAN HUNTER & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRACIES, PUBLIC ADMINISTRA-
TION, AND PUBLIC POLICY 22 (1996). 
39 See Water Quality Act, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948); Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 152. 
40 See HUNTER & WATERMAN, supra note 38, at 22. 
41 Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). This amendment granted 
nationwide control of effluent standards to EPA to be set on an industry-by-industry basis. See 
Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 153. 
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1977,42 and 1987.43 These amendments are commonly known as the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).44 
B. Technology Based Standards 
The CWA divides regulation of water resources into water quality 
based standards and technology based standards.45 The CWA further 
divides the technology based standards into Best Conventional Pol-
lutant Control Technology (BCT)46 and Best Available Technology 
Economically Achievable (BAT).47 
The most significant difference between the two technology based 
standards is the permissibility of economic considerations.48 BCT, a 
lower standard applied to conventional pollutants, allows a considera-
tion of comparative cost-benefits.49 In contrast, BAT, a higher stand-
ard applied to toxics and nonconventional nontoxics, only considers 
the industry-wide costs and dismisses consideration of individual bus-
iness closings unless the relationship between the costs and the addi-
tional water quality improvements are "wholly disproportionate."5o 
The actual technologies required under each standard are evalu-
ated under Best Professional Judgment (BPJ) and are established 
industry-wide.51 The CWA subjects all permitted discharges to tech-
nology based standards. 52 
42 Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 33 
U.S.C.). This amendment added a control oftoxics and incorporation of the Flannery Decree to 
the 1972 Amendment's focus on organic pollutants. See Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 154. 
43 Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (1987). This amendment solidified the relationship between 
technology and water quality based controls. See Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 154. 
44 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994). 
46 See id. §§ 1311, 1313, 1314; National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. 
Reg. 37,370, 37,371 (1989). 
46 See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E). 
47 See id. § 1311(b)(2)(A). 
48 See ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, 
AND SOCIETY 522 (2d ed. 1998). Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) with 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(b)(4)(B). 
49 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 523. Biochemical oxygen demand and suspended solids 
are specific examples of conventional pollutants highlighted by the CWA. See 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1314(a)(4). 
60 PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 522. EPA determines what pollutants will be designated 
as toxics. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(b)(2)(C), 1317(a)(1); see generally Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 
1276 (9th Cir. 1976) (affirming EPA's determination that settleable solids were indicators of 
toxics and that EPA properly held applicant to BAT). Chemicals not included as toxics or 
conventionals, such as ammonia and chlorine, are deemed non-conventional pollutants. See 33 
U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(F); PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 522. 
61 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 522. 
62 See Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 162-63. 
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C. Water Quality Based Standards 
The 1965 Act required each state to develop WQSs and this require-
ment continues under the CW A. 53 States set WQSs to achieve the safe 
water quality of a water body based on its classified use, as well as 
antidegradation considerations.54 States base these classifications on 
designated uses ranging from Class A, pristine waters; to Class B, 
fishable and swimmable waters; all the way to Class D, industrial 
usage.55 States determine where the technology based measures are 
insufficient to meet the designated uses of the waters. 56 EPA may 
review state classifications and maintenance of designated uses for 
interstate and intrastate waters.57 
D. NPDES Permits 
The CWA prohibits discharges of any pollutant into navigable wa-
ters by any person without a permit and discharges not in compliance 
with that permit.58 BPJ controls the standards for effluent limitations 
under the permit. 59 Where the contents of a point source are known, 
EPA holds the permittee to the appropriate BCT or BAT.60 
EPA has primary authority to issue all NPDES permits.61 EPA 
may, however, delegate permitting authority to the states.62 Because 
NPDES permits are subject to the restrictions imposed by local 
WQSs, the CWA, through NPDES permitting, incorporates the state 
WQSS.63 
63 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313; GREGOR I. MCGREGOR, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND ENFORCEMENT 
21 (1994); supra note 37 and accompanying text. The CWA also set a national goal of 
fishable/swimmable waters by July 1, 1983. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2). Predictably, the nation 
has not met this goal. See, e.g., infra note 196 and accompanying text. 
54 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 1. 
66 See RODGERS 2, supra note 37, at 243-44. 
66 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c), (d)(l)(A). 
67 See id. § 1313(a). 
63 See id. § 131l(a). 
69 See Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 162-63. 
60 See supra notes 46--50 and accompanying text. 
6! See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a); Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 164. 
62 See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)-(c). 
63 See id. §§ 131l(b)(1)(C), 1342(a)(1). 
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III. PERMITTING CSOS 
A. EPA GSO Policies 
Despite passage of the CWA, until 1989 many regulators and mu-
nicipalities thought that CSOs could be permitted under federal regu-
lations without meeting effluent limitations.64 Therefore, to address 
this (mis)understanding, EPA issued policies that incorporated CSOs 
into the federal scheme for improved water quality.65 These policies 
reconciled the clear WQS violations presented by CSOs with the lack 
of an appropriate fit within the provisions of the CWA.66 
EPA recognizes that although the CWA envisions a "Zero-Dis-
charge Goal,"67 the goal merely creates a rebuttable presumption that 
all discharges harm the environment and that preservation of water 
quality requires the elimination of those discharges.68 Thus, because 
the amount of inflow into CSSs controls the quantity of wet-weather 
event flows into the system, it is impossible to prevent a CSS overflow 
(such as when a 100-year storm occurs); some flexibility for large 
wet-weather events must be considered.69 
EPA's first policy, the 1989 National Combined Sewer Overflow 
Control Strategy (1989 CSO Policy), clarified that CSOs are consid-
ered point source discharges under the CWA;70 thus, the NPDES 
permitting system controls CSOs.71 As such, CSOs are subject to 
technology based standards and must comply with WQSS.72 
84 See National Combined Sewer Overflow Control Strategy, 54 Fed. Reg. 37,370, 37,371 (1989) 
(noting that the Policy was designed to "control effluents from combined systems which are not 
regulated under the sanitary system standards nor as discharges from separate storm sewer 
regulations"); Northwest Envtl. Assoc. v. City of Portland, 56 F.3d 979, 985 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(noting confusion over effluent limitations for CSOs). 
66 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,688 (1994); 54 
Fed. Reg. at 37,371; Smith, supra note 6, at 10,296. 
66 See 54 Fed. Reg. 37,371; Northwest Envtl.Assoc., 56 F.3d at 985; see also Montgomery 
Envtl. Coalition v. Costle, 646 F.2d 568, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (CSOs are not subject to secondary 
treatment standards but are subject to control under the water quality standards of 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311(b)(I)(B) (1998». 
67 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(I). 
66 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 508; see also RODGERS 2, supra note 37, at 249. 
69 See RAY K. LINSLEY ET AL., WATER-RESOURCES ENGINEERING 697 (4th ed. 1992); see also 
supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
70 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 37,37l. 
71 See Wheatly, supra note 8, at 188; Perciasepe, supra note 28, at l. 
72 See Wheatly, supra note 8, at 188. 
866 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:857 
The 1989 CSO Policy announced three objectives: (1) to ensure that 
CSO discharges occur only as a result of wet-weather;73 (2) to bring 
all wet-weather CSO discharge points into compliance with the tech-
nology based requirements of the CWA and the applicable state 
WQSs; and (3) to minimize water quality, aquatic biota, and human 
health impacts from wet-weather discharges.74 In accordance with 
these goals, the 1989 CSO Policy allowed, in certain situations, a mini-
mal number of overflows which were still compatible with WQSS.75 
The current policy, EPA's 1994 Combined Sewer Overflow Control 
Policy (1994 CSO Policy), elaborates on the 1989 CSO Policy and is 
designed to expedite compliance with the CWA.76 EPA's 1994 CSO 
Policy is the result of a series of negotiations among EPA, regulated 
municipalities, and other stakeholders.77 The 1994 CSO Policy ad-
dresses the perceived shortcomings of the 1989 CSO Policy by includ-
ing a greater recognition of the highly variable and localized nature 
of CSOs and the high costs of elimination.78 For example, EPA esti-
mated the costs of CSO cleanup under the 1989 Policy at $120 billion; 
the 1994 Policy reduced those estimates to $41 billion.79 
B. Water Quality Based Standards 
Under the 1994 CSO Policy, permit applicants establish compliance 
with WQSs either through a Presumption Approach or through a 
Demonstration Approach.so In short, the Presumption Approach al-
73 See Arbucklem, supra note 37, at 193. Dry eso events are specifically prohibited; the 1987 
amendment to the eWA requires that all permits include a prohibition on non-storm eso 
discharges. See id. 
74 See 54 Fed. Reg. at 37,371. 
75 See id. However, the Policy also recognized that some WQSs would need to be adjusted· to 
address eso impacts during wet-weather events. See id. at 37,373. 
76 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,688 (1994). 
77 See Siobhan Mee, Note, Negotiated Rulemaking and Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs): 
Consensus Saves Ossification?, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 242 (1997). 
78 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,688. The 1994 eso Policy reiterated the 1989 eso Policy objectives 
and introduced four additional principles: (1) clear levels of control that would be presumed to 
meet appropriate health and environmental objectives; (2) sufficient flexibility to municipalities, 
especially financially disadvantaged communities, to consider the site-specific nature of esos 
and to determine the most cost-effective means of reducing pollutants and meeting eWA 
objectives and requirements; (3) a phased approach to implementation of eso controls consid-
ering the community's financial capability; and (4) review and revision, as appropriate, of water 
quality standards and their implementation procedures when developing eso control plans to 
reflect the site-specific wet-weather impacts of esos. See id. at 18,689. 
79 See Perciasepe, supra note 28, at 3. 
80 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,692-93. 
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lows a permit holder to presume compliance with WQSs if the permit 
holder achieves: (1) no more than four to six treated discharges per 
year;81 (2) elimination or capture of eighty-five percent of the volume 
of pollutants concerned; or (3) elimination or capture of eighty-five 
percent of the mass of pollutants concerned.82 The Demonstration 
Approach requires the permit holder to establish that the program 
will meet the state WQSs, and that it can be expanded to meet future, 
further regulation.83 
NPDES permit writers can establish water quality based effluent 
limits to meet a receiving water body's classification, such as a maxi-
mum number of overflows per year, effluent limits, and a specification 
of minimum treatment or capture.84 Permit limits may be conditioned 
on storm events to accommodate yearly fluctuations in precipitation.85 
C. Technology Based Standards 
Prior to the 1989 CSO Policy, EPA was unable to establish a BAT 
or a BCT standard for CSOs because discharges were controlled by 
the amount of infiltrating storm water or melting snow and there was 
no practical way to predict the relative proportions of sewage and 
rainwater.86 Permit writers were left to exercise their best profes-
sional judgment.87 Consequently, much of the regulation for these 
discharges originated from, and relied upon, best professionsal judg-
ment solutions that, unlike BATIBCT, introduced site-specific consid-
erations and provided for greater flexibility in addressing local eco-
nomic and technical realities.88 
The 1994 CSO Policy established a framework for evaluating the 
technology based requirements of the CWA and NPDES permits.89 
The policy breaks the NPDES permitting process into two phases.90 
Phase I permitting requires the permit holder to adopt and implement 
81 The 1994 eso Policy defines treatment as: (1) primary clarification; (2) solids and floatables 
disposal; and, if necessary, (3) disinfection of effluents. See id. at 18,693. 
82 See id. at 18,692-93; Wheatiy, supra note 8, at 192. 
83 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,693; Wheatiy, supra note 8, at 192. 
84 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,696. 
85 See id. 
86 See generally Smith, supra note 6; see also supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
87 See Wheatly, supra note 8, at 189. 
88 See PLATER ET AL., supra note 48, at 525; see also supra notes 46-51 and accompanying 
text. 
89 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,696. 
90 See id. 
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Nine Minimum Controls (NMCs)91 and to develop a Long-Term CSO 
Control Plan (LTCP).92 EPA intends to minimize CSO impacts 
through the NMCs by optimizing the use of existing CSO and waste-
water facilities, as well as the use of pollution prevention, public 
notification, and monitoring programs.93 Implementation of the NMCs 
serves as the minimum technology based limitation, establishing the 
BATIBCT.94 EPA has anticipated implementation of NMCs since Jan-
uary 1, 1997.95 
While the scope of the NMCs includes the collection system and 
source controls, it is only a basic guideline-a minimum.96 These tech-
nological implementations do not ensure compliance with state 
WQSS.97 Thus, the permittee must also develop an LTCP under Phase 
I to show how the permittee ultimately plans to comply with the CWA 
and applicable WQSS.98 The NMCs are significant to the WQSs be-
cause they provide the data for cost-benefit and feasibility studies, 
which will determine the permitting requirements for the LTCp'99 
EPA designed the LTCP to provide the requisite technical and 
economic analysis to: (1) determine whether elimination of CSOs is 
feasible; (2) provide a basis for determining which abatement meas-
ures should be implemented for CSOs that will not be eliminated; and 
(3) determine an appropriate schedule for all CSO abatement activi-
ties. lOo The LTCP consists of the following elements: 
(1) Watershed characterization, monitoring, and modeling of CSSs; 
(2) Public participation; 
91 The nine minimum controls are as follows: (1) Proper operation and regular maintenance 
programs for the sewer system and the CSOs; (2) Maximum use of the collection system for 
storage; (3) Review and modification of pretreatment requirements to assure CSO impacts are 
minimized; (4) Maximization of flow to the POTW for treatment; (5) Prohibition of CSOs during 
dry weather; (6) Control of solid and floatable materials in CSOs; (7) Pollution prevention; (8) 
Public notification to ensure that the public receives adequate notification of CSO occurrences 
and CSO impacts; and (9) Monitoring to effectively characterize CSO impacts and the efficacy 
of CSO controls. See id. at 18,691. 
92 See id. at 18,688. 
93 See supra note 91 and accompanying text. 
94 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,696. 
95 See Perciasepe, supra note 28, at 2. However, according to EPA sources, as of April 19, 
1998, only slightly more than half of Massachusetts communities have implemented the NMCs; 
the remainder are scheduled for implementation within the next two years. See id. at 4. 
96 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,695-96. 
97 See id. at 18,695. 
98 See id. at 18,691. 
99 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 5. 
100 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,691; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 44.00 (1998). 
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(3) Maximizing efforts for sensitive use areas; 
(4) Detailed evaluation of alternatives; 
(5) Cost/performance considerations; 
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(6) Operation and maintenance plans for facilities where CSOs will 
continue; 
(7) Maximizing usefulness of POTWs during wet-weather events; 
(8) Preparing a schedule for implementation reflecting current CSO 
impacts on WQSs; and 
(9) A post-construction monitoring program to verify continued 
compliance and to determine efficiency.lol 
The elements of the LTCP provide the factual and analytical basis 
for subsequent efforts to change a designated use.102 Phase II of the 
permitting requires continued implementation and compliance with 
the NMCs and the implementation of the LTCP developed under 
Phase 1.103 
IV. RECEIVING· BODY CLASSIFICATIONS FOR CSOs 
A. Massachusetts Designated Uses 
Under the existing regulatory framework, all Massachusetts CSO 
dischargers must obtain a NPDES Surface Water Discharge Permit 
and a Massachusetts Surface Water Discharge Permit.104 Massachu-
setts WQSs establish goals for the Commonwealth and provide the 
basis for water quality based effluent limitations in NPDES per-
mitS.105 
In response to the 1994 CSO Policy, DEP issued its own CSO Policy 
(DEP CSO Policy) and amended its WQSs to reflect CSO-impacted 
designated uses.l06 The DEP CSO Policy, building upon the flexible 
classifications proposed by EPA's 1994 CSO Policy, provides a menu 
101 See 69 Fed. Reg. at 18,691-94; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 44.08. 
1112 See MASSACHUSETTS DEP, MWRA COMBINED SEWER OVERFWW FINAL FACILITIES 
PLAN/ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT: STATE ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATIONS FOR 
CERTAIN CSO-IMPACTED WATERS; USE ATTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 12 (1997) [hereinafter DEP 
UAA); DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 4; 8ee also MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 44.00, 
tit. 314, § 4.06(1)(d)(10). 
103 See 69 Fed. Reg. at 18,696. 
104 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 1; see also 8Upra notes 71-72. DEP regulates the 
Massachusetts WQSs. See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 22, § 21 (1991). 
106 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.01(4); DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 1. 
106 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 3; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, §§ 4.06(1)(d)(9)-
(10). 
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of options to accommodate a variety of CSO scenarios and adjusts 
the classifications of the receiving water bodies.107 Some of these clas-
sifications allow for CSO impacts during wet-weather events without 
downgrading the year-round WQSS.108 Thus, NPDES permit holders 
for CSOs can still have some discharges without violating the Com-
monwealth's WQSS.109 These water body classifications in Massachu-
setts are as follows: 
(1) Class B or SB-all CSOs are eliminated; 
(2) Class Bcso or SBcso-CSOs are allowed if they conform to water 
quality goals; 
(3) Variance-violation of standards are allowed on a short-term 
basis; 
(4) Partial Use Designation-CSOs remain with moderate impacts 
resulting in intermittent impairment of water quality goals, but clas-
sification of the receiving water body is unchanged; 
(5) Class C-CSOs remain, causing permanent and sustained im-
pairment so that Class B water quality goals cannot be met.110 . 
Where permit holders can eliminate CSOs through sewer separa-
tion or relocation, DEP should classify the receiving waters as Class 
B or SB.111 CSS owners in Class B or SB waters must eliminate all 
CSOs either by sewer separation or by relocating discharges to other, 
less sensitive use areas.l12 
CSO control plans achieving compliance with Class B/SB standards 
at least ninety-five percent of the time should be classified as Bcso or 
SBCSO.118 In Bcso/SBcso waters, although permit holders will achieve 
high levels of control, they will not achieve Class B/SB standards 
during infrequent, large storm events.114 
DEP will only change a classification to Bcso after approving a 
Facilities Plan submitted by the permittee which shows that there 
are no sensitive uses and that infrequent CSO discharges are the most 
environmentally protective and cost-effective option available.115 The 
107 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 1. 
108 See id. 
109 See id. at 3-4. 
110 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, §§ 4.05, 4.06(1)(d)(9)-(10); DEP CSO POLICY, sU'JII'a note 
12, at 1. The "S" differentiates marine bodies from freshwater, i.e., "B" waters. See MASS. REGS. 
CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(4). 
111 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(3)(b); DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 3. 
112 See DEP CSO POLICY, BU'JII'a note 18, at 3. 
113 See id. at 4. 
114 See id. at 3. 
116 See id. at 3. 
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Facilities Plan serves as the LTCP required by EPA's 1994 CSO 
Policy and Phase I of NPDES pennitting.116 
Variance in a receiving body classification, as in landuse planning, 
is an approved, limited violation of the restrictions imposed by the 
classification.1l7 The requirements of Variance are similar to classifica-
tion changes, but the standard of proof to show the infeasibility of the 
total elimination of discharges is lower because Variance is tempo-
rary,us Variance is only effective through the discharge permit and 
does not affect the designated use for the receiving body.119 Variance 
is based on a conclusion that, pending further study, the pennit con-
ditions are the most environmentally protective. and cost-effective 
option available.120 Granting Variance to a pennit holder is most ap-
propriate as an interim measure where the relative CSO impacts and 
feasibility are uncertain and where a designated use of Class B or A 
may be achieved rather than accepting an impacted or lower desig-
nated use.121 
Partial Use is another alternative used in situations where the 
prescribed uses cannot, and will not, be met for an intennittent time, 
i.e., a limited number of short duration discharges per year based on 
one year or other design stonns.l22 Partial Use designations pennit a 
temporary impainnent of the designated use and a change in clas-
sification for the body.123 A river basin, or other body, can be classified 
under Partial Use to be fishable/swimmable for 360 days per year, and 
Id. 
Abatement plans may involve phased work plans with the most cost effective control 
given the highest priority .... It is the goal of the Department to eliminate the adverse 
impacts of CSOs. Where elimination is not feasible or would cause substantial wide-
spread economic and social impact, the impacts of the CSO discharges shall be mini-
mized to achieve the highest water quality attainable. Highest priority will be given 
to eliminating or otherwise controllingCSO discharges to sensitive use areas. 
116 See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 44.00 (1998); 8u'JYf'a note 98 and accompanying text. 
MWRA's FEIR addresses all nine requirements for a LTCP under EPA's 1994 CSO Policy. See 
MWRA FEIR, 8U']Yf'a note 2, at 7-2. 
117 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.04(4). 
118 See DEP CSO POLICY, 8U'JYf'a note 18, at 5. 
119 See id. 
120 See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.04(4)(a)(1-4). 
121 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, SU']Yf'a note 32, at 12-13. 
122 See DEP CSO POLICY, SU']Yf'a note 18, at 5. Design storms are hypothetical storms that 
model typical conditions for intensity and duration. See MCGHEE, 8u'JYf'a note 3, at 270. They 
are categorized by approximated return periods; a one year design storm is the heaviest storm 
anticipated for a one year period. See id. 
123 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, §§ 4.05(2), 4.06(1)(d)(9). 
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classified for a lower designated use during the remaining days.l24 
Thus, unlike Variance, DEP actually changes the designated use in 
recognition of different quantities of contribution to the collection 
system based on larger wet-weather events.l26 Short-term impair-
ments usually must meet the higher classification standard at least 
seventy-five percent of the time.126 Partial Use can be defined as a 
function of a particular season or a particular storm event.l27 The 
change to Partial Use must fully maintain downstream existing uses 
in other seasons or smaller storm events.128 
However, with the clarification of the 1989 CSO Policy by the 1994 
CSO Policy, EPA disfavored the Partial Use classification in favor of 
a greater emphasis on Variance.l29 EPA prefers Variance because it is 
temporary and must be renewed with the expiration of the underlying 
permit, giving EPA and DEP greater bargaining power to insist on 
continued planning and implementation efforts by permit holders.1so 
Finally, Class C is a last resort classification where feasible CSO 
controls cannot, and will not, achieve the current designated use.1Sl 
This classification admits the impossibility of compliance with the 
goals of the CWA for the foreseeable future. l32 
B. Changing Receiving Body Classification 
The menu of classifications enhances flexibility for permittees, mini-
mizes demands on DEP's administrative resources, and provides equi-
valent environmental protection consistent with the realities of CSO 
abatement.l33 DEP may change designated uses to allow CSO dis-
charges to continue if DEP finds, based on the permittee's LTCP, that 
124 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
125 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(2); DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
126 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
127 See id. 
128 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(2); DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
129 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 2 & n.3. 
130 See MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.04(4)(c); Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Executive 
Office of Environmental Affairs, CERTIFICATE OF THE SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL AF-
FAIRS ON THE FINAL FACILITIES PLANIENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 7 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter FEIR CERTIFICATE] (showing the practical way the review period of Variance can be used 
to assess impacts achieved through implementation of the NMCs); see also DEP CSO POLICY, 
supra note 18, at 4. 
131 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(3)(c); DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
132 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 5. 
133 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
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elimination is infeasible.134 Permittees most often establish economic 
infeasibility by showing that the costs of elimination would impose 
substantial and widespread social and economic impact.135 
DEP seeks public participation in considering technical, financial, 
and environmental implications.136 Before changes in classifications of 
receiving bodies may be implemented, the public must be given an op-
portunity to comment.137 For example, DEP must publish a notice in 
the Environmental Monitor before changing a classification to Bcso.138 
For class downgrades to Bpartia1 or C, DEP is required to hold a public 
hearing.139 In addition, DEP must review all classifications every 
three years.140 
Once a state determines that a designated use for a body of water 
should be downgraded, the state agency must submit a Use Attain-
134 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4). This section allows the removal of a designated 
use that is not an existing use, if the applicant demonstrates that: 
Id. 
(a) Naturally occurring pollutant concentrations prevent the attainment of the use; 
or 
(b) Natural, ephemeral intermittent or low flow conditions or water levels prevent 
the attainment of the use, unless these conditions may be compensated for by the 
discharge of sufficient volume of effluent discharges without violating state water 
conservation requirements to enable uses to be met; or 
(c) Human caused conditions or sources of pollution prevent the attainment of the 
use and cannot be remedied or would cause more environmental damage to correct 
than to leave in place; or 
(d) Dams, diversions or other types of hydrologic modifications preclude the attain-
ment of the use, and it is not feasible to restore the water body to its original condition 
or to operate such modification in a way that would result in the attainment of the use; 
or 
(e) Physical conditions related to the natural features of the water body, such as the 
lack of proper substrate, cover, flow, depth, pools, riffles, and the like, unrelated to 
water quality, preclude attainment of aquatic life protection uses; or 
(1) Controls more stringent than those required by sections 31O(b) and 306 of the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.) would result in substan-
tial and widespread economic and social impact. 
130\ See Letter from John P. DeVillars, Regional Administrator, EPA, to David B. Struhs, 
Commissioner, DEP 1 (Feb. 27,1998) [hereinafter EPA Concurrence] (regarding EPA's Concur-
rence with DEP's UAA). 
136 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 6. 
137 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1994); 40 C.F.R. § 131.20 (1999); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, 
§ 4.03(4). 
138 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 3 (1998); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.05(2). 
139 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 30A, § 3; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4)(c). 
140 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313; 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.10, 131.20; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 310, § 41.00. As 
part of this review, EPA will determine whether any allowable CSO designations can feasibly 
be upgraded to Class B. See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 7. 
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ability Analysis (UAA) to EPA.141 State agencies prepare the UAA 
based on the permittee's LTCP.142 The UAA documents the infeasibil-
ity of achieving a higher level of CSO control.143 
EPA requires that the UAA findings be based on a "structured 
scientific assessment" of the existing water body conditions, including 
the chemical, physical, and biological attributes, as well as the eco-
nomic dependence and impacts associated with the water body us-
age.144 EPA may remove designated uses, but not existing uses, for a 
variety of reasons relating to the particular nature of the receiving 
body or the economic impacts of achieving the current designated 
use.145 EPA can reject any state criteria that does not protect the 
designated use or that is not based on a sound scientific rationale.146 
No federal or state authority may remove an existing use-defined 
as those that occurred as of November 28, 1975.147 
Once the state agency forwards its recommendation and U AA to 
EPA, EPA has sixty days to approve, or ninety days to disapprove, 
the modified usage.148 Both EPA and DEP are unlikely to forgive 
discharges affecting sensitive use areas, such as bathing areas, water 
supply intakes, endangered species habitats, and shellfish beds.149 
C. Abatement Measures 
As part of the evaluation for changing designated uses under the 
1994 CSO Policy, and by incorporation of these considerations into the 
DEP CSO Policy, the reviewing agency will look to the LTCP to 
evaluate the feasibility of using alternate methods of reducing water 
quality impairments from CSOS.150 Because sewer separation, where 
the sewer is separated from stormwater collection and conveyed in 
separate pipes, does not address continued discharges of storm water, 
141 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10; MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.06(1)(d)(10). 
142 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 12. 
143 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g). 
144 U.S. ENVTL PROTECTION AGENCY, WATER ENVIRONMENT RESEARCH FOUNDATION DE-
VELOPS PRACTICAL GUIDANCE DOCUMENT FOR CONDUCTING USE-ATTAINABILITY ANALYSIS 
2 (1996). 
145 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g). 
146 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
147 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.3, 131.10(g) (defining existing uses). 
148 See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3) (1994). 
149 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,692 (1994); 
DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 7. 
160 See supra note 100-{)2 and accompanying text. 
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alternative CSO controls can provide superior environmental benefits 
to receiving bodies while supporting existing and proposed uses and 
associated WQSS.151 
Nonetheless, sewer system separation remains the only guaranteed 
method of eliminating CSOS.152 Thus, the permittee must evaluate the 
feasibility of separation before considering any alternatives.l53 How-
ever, where separation is not feasible, the permit holder has several 
alternatives it can propose, including relocation, storage, and treat-
ment.l54 
As an alternative to elimination, relocation is an attractive alterna-
tive for protecting sensitive uses such as bathing areas, shellfishing 
areas, water supply sources, and endangered species habitats.155 The 
relocation of discharges away from sensitive-use environments to less 
fragile areas achieves many of the goals of the CWA.156 However, 
relocation still results in CSO discharges and, therefore, may not 
achieve the overall water quality benefits of separation.157 N onethe-
less, sensitive areas benefit by becoming "CSO-Free."158 
Storage and treatment are alternatives to relocation or separa-
tion.159 Storage functions much like a detention basin, allowing for 
timed releases of sewage and stormwater accumulated during heavy 
precipitation or melting periods.160 Storage facilities gradually release 
the accumulated volumes, avoiding peak flow times that trigger CSOs 
and allow the stored sewage and stormwater to stay in the CSS 
system for treatment at the POTW.161 
151 See 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,688; DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 7; Letter from Arleen 
O'Donnell, Assistant Commissioner, DEP, to Ron Manfredonia, Associate Director for Water 
Quality Policy, EPA 3 (July 25, 1997) [hereinafter DEP Response to EPA] (regarding DEP Draft 
CSO Policy and Guidance); see also FEIR CERTIFICATE, supra note 130, at 2 (discussing 
significant impact of storm water on water quality, much of which would continue even if 
separation occurred). "Water quality modeling has demonstrated that in some areas, alternative 
CSO controls, such as storage and/or treatment, would provide superior water quality benefits, 
at equivalent or lower cost as compared to full separation." DEP Response to EPA, supra, at 
2. 
152 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 5 (as long as sewers are combined with 
stormwater inflows, the potential volume of inflows is unlimited). 
153 See id. at 5-6. 
154 See id. 
155 See id. 
156 See supra notes 27, 53, 112 and accompanying text. 
157 See supra note 152 and accompanying text. 
158 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
159 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 6. 
160 See id. 
161 See id. 
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Treatment functions like a miniature POTW.I62 Treatment of CSOs 
includes screening, removing solids, and disinfecting overflows before 
they reach the receiving body.l63 This treatment minimizes the nega-
tive impact of discharges on the receiving body.164 As with all alterna-
tives, permittees must evaluate the effectiveness and viability of 
treatment for a location and compare the treatment results to the 
feasibility of discharge elimination.165 
A review of alternative control technologies includes the following 
factors: increases in stormwater flow and changes in pollutant load 
achieved through sewer separation; CSO corrective action time 
frames for alternative control options; presence and effect on sensi-
tive-use areas; cost-benefit analysis based on receiving body water 
quality improvements; construction impacts on surrounding busi-
nesses; and projected effectiveness of alternative control measures 
based, in part, on results achieved through the NMCs in Phase 1.166 
D. Establishing Infeasibility On Economic Grounds 
Permit applications and procedures for changing designated uses 
factor economic considerations into each stage of review.167 In devel-
oping the LTCP, the 1994 CSO Policy recommends that the permit 
applicant evaluate alternative abatement measures using a "knee of 
the curve" analysis-charting the effectiveness of each measure in 
attaining water quality benefits versus the cost of additional meas-
ures.168 If, as part of the LTCP, the permittee finds that CSO elimina-
tion is economically infeasible, the applicant submits her findings to 
DEP with her LTCP requesting a change in designated use.169 
In evaluating whether to grant a change in designated use, DEP 
looks to a variety of natural factors affecting attainability, as well as 
whether CSO elimination would cause "substantial and widespread 
social and economic impacts" on the community.170 DEP makes several 
162 See id. 
163 See id. 
164 See DEP csa GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 6. 
166 See supra note 152-53 and accompanying text. 
166 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 10. 
167 See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g)(6) (1999); Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 
59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,688 (1994); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4) (1998). 
168 59 Fed. Reg. at 18,688. A "knee of the curve" analysis evaluates the additional water quality 
benefits per control measure looking for the point at which the return on investment is dimin-
ished regardless of additional efforts. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. 
169 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4); supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text. 
170 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 314, § 4.03(4). 
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references to this test, explaining it as an incremental cost-benefit or 
cost-effectiveness review.l7l 
In order to meet the required "showings" of effectiveness and 
preference for an alternative, a permit holder or applicant may pre-
sent: (1) average annual duration and volume of CSO for each alter-
native; (2) model outputs which estimate the duration of violations of 
WQSs such as fecal coliform for a range of storm events, as well as 
an annual average; (3) model outputs estimating frequency and dura-
tion of beach closings or other use losses; and (4) average annual 
pollution load removal and cost.172 The evaluation should contain a 
comparison of the costs, performance, and technical considerations of 
all abatement alternatives.173 
Since EPA's 1994 CSO Policy universally requires NMC implemen-
tation by all permit holders under Phase I, the results observed from 
implementing these measures provide a practical baseline for compar-
ing technologies in each receiving body.174 Assuming a finding of sub-
stantial impact, DEP submits a UAA to EPA recommending a change 
in designated use.175 
Finally, the same language of "substantial and widespread social 
and economic impacts" appears in EPA's review of whether to ap-
prove state requests for changes in designated uses.176 Since there is 
little guidance in the 1994 CSO Policy, EPA published an economic 
guidance recommending a method of calculating the impact that 
states may use.177 
V. MWRA's ApPLICATION FOR AN NPDES PERMIT 
A. Success Under the 1994 GSa Plan 
As discussed, EPA acknowledges a substantial change in the scope 
of required work between the 1989 CSO Policy and the 1994 CSO 
Policy.178 These changes in policy, though laudable for their considera-
tion of economic consequences, caused some uncertainty and confu-
171 See infra notes 278-86 and accompanying text. 
172 See DEP csa GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 7-8. 
173 See id. at 7. 
174 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra notes 141--43 and accompanying text. 
176 40 C.F.R. § 131.l0(g)(6) (1999). 
177 See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC GUIDANCE FOR WATER QUALITY STANDARDS-WORKBOOK, 
(1995) [hereinafter EPA ECONOMIC GUIDANCE], at cover letter. 
178 See supra notes 29, 78-79 and accompanying text. 
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sion for permit applicants.179 For example, MWRA plans to receive 
NPDES permitting evolved from MWRA's original plan, which called 
for a tunneled storage facility under Boston, to the present plan which 
combines treatment, separation, CSS capacity increases, and in-
creased pumping capacity at the POTW.l80 
The original MWRA plan, developed prior to the 1994 CSO Policy, 
emphasized storage of excess flows during wet-weather events by 
tunneling a twenty-five foot wide tunnel, thirteen miles long, under 
Boston.1Sl This tunnel would have cost $1.3 billion.l82 However, based 
on studies consistent with the mandates of the NMCs,183 EPA and 
MWRA concluded that this measure was an overstatement of actual 
conditions and actions required.l84 This change in understanding de-
veloped in part from the greater flexibility and the introduction of a 
cost-benefit analysis in early drafts of the 1994 CSO Policy, which 
EPA was developing concurrently with MWRA's request for appro-
val. 185 
179 See, e.g., DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 1 (expressing confusion that EPA 
disagreed with DEP's CSO Policy position regarding economic infeasibility, noting that "[a]ny 
determination that fails to consider water quality benefits appears to be inconsistent with EPA 
regulations, guidance and policies, including the EPA 1994 National CSO Policy .... "); Letter 
from Ron Manfredonia, Associate Director for Water Quality Policy, EPA, to Arleen O'Donnell, 
Assistant Commissioner, DEP 2 (May 7, 1997) (regarding EPA Comments on [DEP's] Draft 
CSO Policy and Draft CSO Guidance) [hereinafter EPA Comments] (declaring the "knee of the 
curve" analysis, infra notes 249-52, inappropriate in determining substantial and widespread 
social and economic impacts). 
180 See Letter from Steven G. Lipman, Boston Harbor Coordinator, DEP, to Douglas MacDon-
ald, Executive Director, MWRA 3 (Oct. 31,1997) [hereinafter DEP Tentative FEIR Approval] 
(regarding MWRA CSO Control Program Final Facilities Plan Tentative Approval); FEIR 
CERTIFICATE, supra note 130, at 1; Patrick M. Fitzgibbons, Cleanup of Boston Harbor Has 
Caught $1 Billion Break, Authority Reports, THE BOND BUYER, Sept. 9, 1994, at 3 (the original 
proposal by MWRA contemplated tunneled storage under Boston); Scott Allen, MWRA Plan 
Slashes Cost of Harbor Cleanup, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 8, 1994, at 25 (original MWRA proposal 
called for a tunnel under Boston). 
181 See Fitzgibbons, supra note 180, at 3 (proposed tunnel under Boston would have been 13 
miles long and 25 feet wide). 
182 See Allen, supra note 180, at 25 (the original MWRA proposal, based on a tunnel under 
Boston, had an estimated price tag of $1.3 billion). 
183 See supra notes 91, 99 and accompanying text. 
184 See Interview with Virginia Renick, MWRA (Aug. 14, 1997) [hereinafter Renick Interview, 
8/14197]; see also Scott Allen, Charles Cleanup Gets New EPA Push. Focus This Time Around 
On Pollution Prevention, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 22, 1995, at 33 ("But unlike the multibillion-dollar 
project to clean up Boston Harbor, the EPA plan stresses low-cost measures first, from better 
street sweeping and plumbing repairs to increased chlorination of storm water ... state and 
local environmental officials now believe the pollution sources along the Charles are so diffuse-
spread across nine cities and towns-that the MWRA's combines sewer overflow program might 
not solve the problem."). 
185 See Tour of MWRA CSO Facilities, October 31, 1997 [hereinafter MWRA CSO Tour]. 
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Thus, in 1994, MWRA set about developing a more realistic re-
sponse to CSOs which incorporated the studies of contributing envi-
ronmental groups and the beginnings of the NMC.186 MWRA pre-
sented a plan outlining twenty-eight separate projects, including sep-
aration, detention, and treatment, with an estimated cost of $372 
million. 187 
Public officials heralded the MWRA plan as a model of regulatory 
cooperation, symbolizing the collaborative efforts underlying the 1994 
CSO Policy.l88 The cooperative nature led to a reasoned proposal that 
reduced a $1.3 billion project to a series of separate projects at one-
third of the cost. 189 
In April of 1996, Vice President Al Gore visited Massachusetts and, 
standing out on Flagship Wharf in the Charlestown Navy Yard with 
V.S. Senator John F. Kerry (D. Mass.) and Boston Mayor Thomas 
Menino, announced that federal officials applauded MWRA's CSO 
Plan.l90 However, as MWRA neared its review by EPA in 1997, EPA 
appeared reluctant to approve MWRA's plan, in part, because of 
EPA's initiation of an aggressive plan in 1996 for a "Fishable, Swim-
mable Charles by 2005" campaign.191 
As part of MWRA's continuing improvements, MWRA began con-
version of several CSO sites, which were then only screening and 
disinfecting CSOs, to combined storage/treatment facilities.192 With 
continued implementation, MWRA projected an estimated cost of 
$451 million for its final CSO control plan.193 However, even after these 
changes, MWRA still anticipated that EPA would not concur with any 
DEP V AA for changes in designated use for the Charles River.194 The 
change in EPA's position, from earlier anticipation of approval, swung 
in significant part on its interpretation of the standards applied to 
186 See Renick Interview, 8114/97, supra note 184. 
187 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 3-5, 3-6. This proposal was known as the 1994 CSO 
Conceptual Plan. See id. at 3-5. 
188 See A Better Solutionfor the Harbor, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1996, at 20; Richard Chacon, 
Gore: Scaled-Down Harbor Plan OK'd, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 21, 1996, at 22. 
189 See Allen, supra note 180, at 25. 
190 See Chacon, supra note 188, at 22. 
191 See Renick Interview, 8114/97, supra note 184; Allen, supra note 180, at 33 (quoting John 
DeVillars, New England EPA administrator, "I realize that 2005 is an ambitious target. Some 
may think it too ambitious. But after the clean up of the Boston Harbor, the Charles deserves 
no less."). This program is consistent with the Charles River's current classification: "B." See 
FEIR CERTIFICATE, supra note 130, at 5. 
192 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
193 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at Table A. 
194 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
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economic impact for changing designated uses, as well as EPA's focus 
on afford ability as the sole means of evaluating economic infeasibil-
ity.195 
Prior to 1997, all bodies of water in Massachusetts were designated 
as at least Class B-fishable/swimmable.196 Thus, for MWRA to con-
tinue any CSO discharges and achieve the two-thirds savings for its 
ratepayers, MWRA would have to convince EPA that further efforts 
to decrease CSO impacts would cause substantial and widespread 
social and economic impacts.197 
B. The Final MWRA Plan 
At different discharge sites, MWRA experiences as many as forty 
to fifty discharges per year.19B In total, throughout the MWRA service 
district, there are sixty-seven active CSO discharge sites.199 This num-
ber includes discharges from south of Boston, in Quincy and Dorches-
ter Bay, to the North End of Boston at Prison Point, and along the 
Charles River.200 Early estimates of MWRA CSO events were as high 
as 7 billion gallons of untreated sewage per year.201 
Under the Final Facilities Plan, MWRA will capture and treat 
99.6% of all CSO volumes, reducing untreated discharges by ninety-
two percent.202 Of the remaining discharges, MWRA will treat over 
ninety percent of CSO discharges.203 MWRA will eliminate all dis-
196 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
196 See MASSACHUSETIS DEP, FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DETERMINATION FOR CSO IM-
PACTED WATER WITHIN THE MASSACHUSETTS WATER RESOURCES AUTHORITY (MWRA) 
SEWER SERVICE AREA 1 n.3 (1997) [hereinafter DEP FINAL FEIR ApPROVAL]. The Charles 
River never meets this classification, even during dry weather. See FEIR CERTIFICATE, supra 
note 130, at 5. 
197 See 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(g)(6) (1999); supra notes 141-45, 176 and accompanying text. 
198 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
199 See Interview with Virginia Renick, MWRA (Feb. 27, 1999) [hereinafter Renick Interview, 
2127/99]. The MWRA FEIR indicated that MWRA originally had 81 CSO discharge sites. See 
MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 2--1. Since then, MWRA discovered one more site, for a total 
number of 82 sites. See Renick Interview, 2127/99, supra. MWRA efforts under its control plan 
to date are responsible for reducing the total number of active sites to 67. See id. 
200 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 2--1. 
201 See Thomas Salvage, Note, Boston Harbor: The Anatomy of a Court-Run Cleanup, 22 B.C. 
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 365, 376 (1995). 
200 See DEP Tentative FEIR Approval, supra note 180, at 3 (noting capture and treatment of 
99.6% of total CSO volume, and 92% reduction in volume of untreated CSOs); FEIR CER-
TIFICATE, supra note 130 (noting MWRA plan will reduce "discharges into [Boston Harbor and 
its tributaries] by 99.6 percent"). Previous estimates of total discharge volume in 1992 were 
approximately 1.5 billion gallons. See Wheatly, supra note 8, at 194. 
203 See DEP Tentative FEIR Approval, supra note 180, at 3 (noting 92% treatment of remain-
ing CSOs). 
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charges in sensitive uses areas such as North and South Dorchester 
Bays, the Neponset River, and Constitution Beach.204 Ninety-five per-
cent of all flows will reach MWRA's POTW at Deer Island.205 
An example of the proposed new treatment/storage plan is under 
development at Cottage Farm.206 This facility is located on the Cam-
bridge side of the Charles River, midway between the Watertown 
Dam and the Charles River Dam-areas most commonly associated 
with collegiate sailing and rowing competitions and serving as a scenic 
backdrop to the Hatch Shell, a popular outdoor arena which hosts 
concerts such as the Boston Pops during the Fourth of July fireworks 
celebration.207 Cottage Farm is one of nineteen CSO sites that dis-
charge into the Charles River during wet-weather events.208 Cur-
rently, the plant operates as a diversion facility, treating and discharg-
ing excess flows from the upstream CSS network.209 When the 
upstream capacity is insufficient to convey the combined flows to 
MWRA's POTW at Deer Island, the plant uses its 1.3 million gallon 
concrete treatment basins as detention facilities.210 In combining the 
detention and CSS capacities, the Cottage Farm facility prevents 
flows during all but twenty storms in the average year.211 When dis-
charge events occur, the Cottage Farm facility treats the combined 
stormwater and sewage by screening, disinfection, and sedimentation 
before the discharge reaches the Charles River.212 This facility does 
not treat the removed solids.213 Solids are reintroduced into the CSS 
system for treatment at Deer Island.214 
MWRA's final plan, including separation of upstream sources and 
improvements to the existing facility, will cut the average yearly 
discharges from almost twenty to seven discharges per year and will 
add a step to dechlorinate the treated CSOS.215 In evaluating addi-
204 See id.; DEP UAA, supra note 102, at Table A. These areas are located in East Boston or 
along the south shore of Boston Harbor. Historically, these have been associated with recrea-
tional swimming as well as shellfish harvesting. See id. 
205 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 7-24. This percentage is estimated for 2008, up from 
68% treatment at the POTW in 1988. See id. 
206 See id. at 25-55. 
207 See id. at 4-41, 4-44, 25-55. 
208 See id. at 4-41. 
209 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
210 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-70. 
211 See id. at 25-70. 
212 See id. 
213 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
214 See id. 
215 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at Table A; Renick Interview, 2127/99, supra note 193; see 
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tional control measures, MWRA deemed additional controls infeasi-
ble.216 MWRA found that relocation was not a feasible alternative 
because there are no less-sensitive receiving water areas in the vicin-
ity of the outfall from the Cottage Farm facility.217 MWRA also found 
that further separation was infeasible in view of the large watershed 
contributing to the Cottage Farm facility.218 Finally, MWRA's evalu-
ation of total elimination revealed that a facility of sufficient storage 
volume for complete elimination of CSOs must be almost seven times 
larger than the existing facility, increasing the costs by over $60 
million.219 In contrast, MWRA plans to spend just over $3 million.220 
The MWRA improvements will reduce total volumes of discharge 
at Cottage Farm from an original 1.5 billion gallons, and the current 
110 million gallons, to 26.7 million gallons.221 All discharges will be 
screened, treated with chlorine, and dechlorinated prior to dis-
charge.222 
C. The Cost of the Final Plan to Rate Payers 
Under the MWRA's Final Combined Sewer Overflow Facilities 
Plan and Environmental Impact Report (FEIR), the total planning 
and construction cost will amount to $451 million, divided among 
twenty-five individual projects.223 Of the eighty-two original CSO dis-
charge sites, thirty will have been closed (no discharges), forty-six will 
be reduced to a minimal number of CSO events per year (no more 
than four per average year), and five will have treated discharges (as 
at Cottage Farm).224 In so doing, MWRA will eliminate discharges in 
all sensitive use areas.225 All of these improvements are in addition to 
also Peter J. Howe, Price Enters Fray on How Clean to Get Charles, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 16, 
1997, at B3. 
216 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-56, 25-82. 
217 See id. at 25-56. 
218 See id. at 25-56. 
219 See id. at 25-75. 
220 See id. at 25-75. 
221 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-82, 25-83, 25-84; MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
222 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-82, 25-83, 25-84; MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
223 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 1-1; DEP UAA, supra note 102, at Table A; see also 
Peter J. Howe, MWRA Told to Step Up Overflow Reduction, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 1, 1997, at 
B3 (total cost about $450 million). 
224 See MWRA CSO '!bur, supra note 185. 
225 See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
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over $200 million spent by the Commonwealth to address water qual-
ity improvements in and along the Charles River under the CWA.226 
Final impacts to ratepayers for these improvements will be passed 
on in the sewer and wastewater bills.227 According to MWRA projec-
tions, an improvement of $10 million translates into a one dollar per 
year increase per household for its ratepayers.228 On the basis of the 
work proposed in MWRA's FEIR, EPA and MWRA estimate that 
annual costs for MWRA wastewater customers will reach as much as 
$723 per household.229 These estimates attribute ninety-three dollars 
of that amount to CSO improvements.23o 
D. Approval 
In October 1997, DEP approved MWRA's LTCP subject to devel-
opment and approval to Variance areas.231 On the basis of that plan, 
DEP recommended Variance for MWRA's permits for discharges in 
the Charles River and the Mystic River Basin, as well as changes in 
designated use, from Class Band SB to Class Bcso and SBcso for the 
remaining discharge areas where the MWRA LTCP does not propose 
CSO elimination.232 
DEP's recommendations reflect the contribution of upstream pollu-
tion sources to the overall water quality of the Charles River, the 
continued challenges of storm water discharges which would continue 
even after separation, and the economic infeasibility of total storage.233 
DEP found that MWRA met the requirements for water quality stan-
226 See Peter J. Howe, Renaissance on the Charles, BOSTON GLOBE MAGAZINE, Oct. 5, 1993, 
at 29. 
227 See, e.g., EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 3-4. MWRA directly supplies cities and 
towns with sewer service, drinking water, or both. See MWRA, Water and Sewer Rates (visited 
Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.mwra.com/orglhtmllrates.htm>. These cities and towns pay MWRA 
directly for its services. See id. Residents of the subscribing areas then pay the towns for their 
services. See id. Regardless of the intermediary/municipalities, residents of MWRA-supplied 
cities and towns are the ultimate customers ("ratepayers") of MWRA's CSO plan. See id. 
228 See Howe, supra note 215, at B3. 
229 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at Attachment AI. 
230 See Letter from Michael J. Hornbrook, Program Director, MWRA, to Steven G. Lipman, 
Boston Harbor Coordinator, DEP 2 (December 1, 1997) (regarding MWRA CSO Control Plan-
Ratepayer Impact). 
231 See DEP FINAL FEIR ApPROVAL, supra note 196, at 2-3. 
232 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 4-5. The remaining areas are the Boston Inner Harbor, 
Chelsea Creek, Island End, Little Mystic Channels, and tidal portions of the Mystic and Charles 
Rivers. See id. 
233 See id. at 10. 
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dards under both the Presumption and the Demonstration means.234 
The Demonstration showing was met because of the significant water 
quality hazards existing independent of CSOs and MWRA's reduction 
of CSO impacts.235 These conclusions were supported by extensive 
studies of the MWRA region conducted by MWRA since 1992.236 
Furthermore, the MWRA plan addressed future expansion if neces-
sary.237 MWRA's implementation of the NMCs addresses the technol-
ogy requirements of the CW A.238 
After approval, DEP submitted its findings to EPA as part of its 
UAA for final approval of designated use changes.239 EPA concurred 
that MWRA had sufficiently established an effective CSO control 
policy as required for the NPDES permit and that it had shown 
substantial widespread social and economic impact.240 
Finally, DEP issued final Variance for MWRA's CSO control plan 
in the Charles River basin.241 DEP issued this Variance for two years 
to give MWRA time to investigate the feasibility of additional CSO 
controls along the Charles.242 DEP is in the process of issuing a similar 
Variance for the Alewife/Upper Mystic River.243 
234 See id. at 14; supra notes 80, 83 and accompanying text. 
235 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 14; supra notes 80, 83 and accompanying text; see also 
MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 7-2, 7-3, 7-15. 
236 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 7-2, 7-3, 7-15. 
237 See id. at 7-31; supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
238 See FEIR CERTIFICATE, supra note 130, at 5; Renick Interview, 2/27/99, supra note 199; 
supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text. MWRA has met the NMCs except that the maximi-
zation of treatment at the POTW is impossible until MWRA completes and activates the 99 mile 
outfall pipe for MWRNs Deer Island facility; and MWRA will not complete floatables control 
until further study of the effectiveness of underflow baffles at nontreatment CSO sites. See 
Renick Interview, 2/27/99, supra note 199; see also DEP Tentative FEIR Approval, supra note 
180, at 5 (discussing MWRA plans to address floatables); Discharge Permits: Permit for $3.9 
Billion Treatment Plant in Massachusetts Called "7bughest" in U.S., supra note 8 (detailing 
Deer Island Outfall Pipe permitting process and outfall facility). 
239 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 1. 
240 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 1. 
241 See DEP, FINAL (9/2/98) VARIANCE FOR THE MWRA CSO CONTROL PLAN IN THE CHAR-
LES RIVER BASIN 1 (1998). 
242 See id.; see also supra notes 121, 130 and accompanying text. 
243 See Mass. DEP, Notice of Availability MWRA Combined Sewer Overflow Plan Alewife 
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VI. A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION 
A. The Controversy 
Although EPA and DEP both approved a designation of Variance 
to MWRA for the Charles River Basin and a change in designated 
use for the remaining CSO-impacted areas, DEP and EPA disagree 
over the methods of calculating such impact.244 EPA insists that the 
impact should be evaluated based on an "ability to pay" basis, calcu-
lating the maximum per capita costs that can be imposed on the 
community; DEP insists that the standard should be based on a 
cost-benefit analysis of the results achieved for the dollars spent using 
a "knee of the curve" analysis.245 
The controversy at issue is how to interpret 314 CMR 4.03(4), which 
allows continued CSO discharge after a showing that complete sewer 
separation and CSO elimination would cause "substantial and wide-
spread economic and social impact," and 40 C.F.R. §131.1O(g)(6), which 
outlines the federal requirements for allowing changes in designated 
uses that announce the same standard.246 
B. EPA's "Ability to Pay" Analysis 
EPA's 1994 CSO Policy introduces a "knee of the curve" analysis to 
determine how a permittee should evaluate abatement alternatives.247 
This "knee of the curve" analysis is detailed on a technological basis 
in an article by David S. Bailey, who at the time of authorship was a 
senior attorney and a scientist with the Environmental Defense Fund 
and member of a CSO work group established by EPA.248 His article 
Brook/Upper Mystic River DEP Administrative Determination Relative to Water Quality 
Standards, available from DEP: One Winter Street, 6th Floor, Boston, MA 02108. 
244 See supra notes 179,231--32,240-43 and accompanying text. 
245 See DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 2; see also supra note 179 and accompanying 
text. "In recent discussions with EPA, [DEP] staff have reiterated the use of 'affordability' for 
determining whether there is widespread social and economic impact for approval of UAAs. 
When asked for written guidance explicitly stating this policy, EPA could not provide a specific 
citation but promised to send something this week. Because EPA must concur with the UAA, 
we will remain in conflict if DEP uses its facility planningl'knee of the curve' and EPA uses 
affordability to conclude there is widespread social and economic impact. If EPA has flexibil-
ity-and flexibility was, after all, the cornerstone of the 1994 Policy-then I suspect we can 
arrive at a mutually acceptable position." DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 2. 
246 DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 2. 
247 See Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,693 (1994). 
248 See David S. Bailey, The Light at the End of the Sewer: How Interested Parties Negotiated 
886 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 26:857 
details a study comparing the actual CSO discharges over forty years 
to the design standards for sizing CSO facilities.249 The study con-
cluded that eighty-five percent capture was a ''break point.''260 Accord-
ing to the study, expenditures to capture more than this amount of 
CSO discharges quickly became disproportionate to achieved con-
trols.261 For example, construction of an additional twenty percent in 
storage capacity only achieved a five percent decrease in CSO emis-
sions over one year.262 
Although Bailey's article applies this analysis in evaluating techni-
cal alternatives, the results of the study also represent the economic 
challenges when one considers the additional costs associated with 
construction of the additional capacity.253 In fact, the 1994 CSO Policy 
expressly states that in establishing the LTCP for the operator, the 
proposal should include an analysis to determine "where the incre-
ment of pollution reduction achieved in the receiving water diminishes 
compared to the increased costS."254 This consideration reflects the 
reality that designing CSO systems to avoid discharges in ex-
treme, unusual wet-weather events (such as events over two inches 
in volume) is inefficient-especially when, (1) the impact of non-CSO 
sources on water quality is recognized; and (2) these unusual wet-
weather events occur at times when swimming or fishing are unlikely 
uses.255 
However, according to EPA, this method of cost-effective evalu-
ation is inappropriate for establishing the infeasibility of attaining a 
designated use, even though it is part of the LTCP.256 EPA states that 
a Consensus Solution to the Combined Sewer OverjtrYw Problem, in NATIONAL WATER RE-
SOURCES REGULATION: WHERE IS THE ENVIRONMENTAL PENDULUM Now? 204 (1994). 
249 See id. 
250 Id. 
261 See id. 
2fi2 See id. at 206. 
253 See, e.g., MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 21H!4 (noting that the difference in cost between 
improving the Cottage Fann facility to capture all but four storms per year and stopping all 
discharges changes the cost from $27 million to $66 million-in other words a $39 million capacity 
that gets used four times per year). 
2fi4 Combined Sewer Overflow (CSO) Control Policy, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,688, 18,693 (1994). 
266 See MCGHEE, supra note 3, at 268; Bailey, supra note 242, at 207. 
256 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 3. "It would not be appropriate ... for a state 
to base a UAA entirely on a finding that further CSO controls are beyond the 'knee' of a 
cost-performance curve. The 'substantial and widespread social and economic impact' standard 
is not a cost-benefit test. While EPA encourages consideration of cost-performance curves as 
part of the development of csa control plans, such information cannot by itself justify a change 
in water quality." Id. 
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a cost-benefit or cost-effective analysis is appropriate for choosing 
between technologies and control strategies if a permittee cannot 
eliminate all CSOs, but it is not the appropriate mechanism for deter-
mining the level of control generally necessary for the permittee on 
a system-wide basis.257 
EPA does not mention this distinction in its 1994 CSO Control 
Policy and according to DEP, it was not considered by EPA while 
DEP developed its own CSO Policy.258 This discrepancy was not high-
lighted until EPA's public comment letter to DEP's Draft CSO Policy 
and EPA's concurrence on Variance for the Charles River.259 
EPA's concurrence details its calculation for "substantial and wide-
spread economic and social impacts.''260 According to EPA, economic 
impact is a factor of affordability based on local unemployment rates, 
municipal bond ratings, and debt level, among other factors.261 As a 
sample analysis, EPA attached sample calculations for Boston and 
for Chelsea, a city across the harbor from Boston but within the 
MWRA district.262 Under its analysis, EPA determined that wastewa-
ter charges in total will reach 2.28% of the median household income 
(MHI) for Chelsea and 1.65% in Boston.263 EPA calculated combined 
sewer and water rates of 3.79% and 2.98% for the communities, re-
spectively.2M For MWRA service districts, the average sewer cost will 
be 1.25% of MHI and the combined water and sewer rates will be 
2.1%.265 
257 See id; see also EPA Comments, supra note 179, at 2. "A cost-benefit analysis is appropriate 
for choosing between technologies and control strategies if a permittee cannot eliminate all 
CSOs, but it is not the appropriate mechanism for determining the level of control that is feasible 
on a system-wide basis. Rather, permittees must implement all affordable CSO controls neces-
sary to comply with water quality standards." EPA Comments, supra note 179, at 2. 
268 See DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 1; see also Mee, supra note 77, at 244 (''The 
desire to satisfy all participants may tempt an agency that sponsors negotiated rule making to 
paper over differences when it produces the final rule or policy."). 
At the time these regulatory revisions were promulgated, the Department clearly 
articulated its rationale to EPA as well as to potentially affected permittees, environ-
.mental organizations, and other interested parties. Ample opportunity for comment 
was afforded at that time, and neither EPA nor any interested party adversely com-
mented upon DEP's approach to these revisions. In fact, EPA supported the proposed 
revisions, and DEP and EPA presented a unified front at public presentations. 
DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 1. 
269 See supra notes 256-57 and accompanying text. 
260 EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 3, Attachments A, B. 
261 See id. at Attachments A 2-3, B 2-3. 
262 See id. at Attachments A, B. 
263 See id. at 3. 
264 See id. 
266 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 4. 
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The EPA example then compared these results to guidelines pub-
lished in EPA's Interim Economic Guidance for Water Quality Stand-
ards (EPA Economic Guidance).266 EPA's Economic Guidance sug-
gests two tests: a screener test to quantify the amount of the impact, 
and a secondary test to evaluate the community's ability to afford the 
impact.267 The screener test simply takes the combined cost of sewer 
and water services as a percentage of the MHI.268 A value greater 
than two percent is considered a large impact and is a candidate for 
a finding of substantial and widespread impact.269 
The secondary test weighs six factors on a scale from one to three 
with one representing economic weakness and three representing 
economic strength.270 The six factors are: (1) bond rating; (2) debt per 
capita; (3) unemployment rate; (4) MHI; (5) property tax revenue as 
a percentage of market value; and (6) property tax collection rate.271 
When the screening test was applied to MWRA's ratepayers, the 
results were above the two percent listed in EPA's Economic Guid-
ance.272 The higher secondary score was a 2.2.273 The combination of 
these test results, when applied to EPA's Economic Guidance, indi-
cated a likelihood of substantial and widespread social impacts.274 
Therefore, EPA's Economic Guidance calls for additional considera-
tion of factors indicating a change in the socioeconomic conditions of 
the community-such as the effect of increased rates on property 
values and whether the additional cost burdens would threaten local 
businesses or deter new businesses from locating in the community.275 
In total, considering the results of the screening test and the secon-
dary test, and noting MWRA's pending improvements to comply with 
the Safe Drinking Water Act,276 EPA concluded that further eso 
controls would impose substantial and widespread social and eco-
nomic impacts.277 
266 See id. at Attachments A, B; see generally EPA ECONOMIC GUIDANCE, supra note 178. 
267 See EPA ECONOMIC GUIDANCE, supra note 177, at 2-2, 2-14, 2-16, 2-17. 
268 See id. at 2-14. 
269 See id. at 2-15. 
270 See id. at 2-17, 2-24. 
271 See id. at 2-18, 2-19, 2-20, 2-21. 
272 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at Attachments A 2-3, B 2-3. 
273 See id. at Attachment B 3. 
274 See EPA ECONOMIC GUIDANCE, supra note 178, at 2-29. 
275 See id. at 4-2, 4-3, 4-4. 
276 42 U.S.C. § 300f-q (1994). 
277 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 2, Attachments A 3, B 3. 
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C. DEP's Cost-Effectiveness Method 
DEP's position reflects a similar concern for the overall costs of 
CSO improvements, but factors into the evaluation the actual water 
quality benefit achieved per dollar spent.278 This analysis is the same 
as the "knee of the curve" analysis employed by EPA in evaluating 
abatement alternatives under the 1994 CSO Policy.279 
DEP argues that focusing solely on the affordability of the meas-
ures could result "in dramatic cost increases to CSO permittees in 
Massachusetts, with little or no receiving water benefits.''280 Accord-
ing to DEP, this is especially true where CSOs contribute a minor 
percentage of total pollutant loads in the receiving body.2Bl DEP's own 
research, based on water quality modeling, shows that alternative 
CSO control measures can provide equivalent or better water quality 
at a reduced cost when compared to sewer separation.282 Such results 
reflect the stormwater discharges that separation would fail to elimi-
nate and, unlike combined discharges at CSO sites such as Cottage 
Farm, would be discharged without treatment.2&'! 
For example, MWRA calculations indicate that elimination of all 
CSO events on the Charles River would only reduce suspended solid 
and biochemical oxygen demand in the river by fifteen percent, indi-
cating that approximately eighty-five percent of water quality degra-
dation in the Charles River comes from non-CSO sources.284 The mini-
mal impact of additional CSO discharges on water quality reflects the 
dilution of sewage that occurs with the extreme wet-weather events 
that are required to trigger CSOs as CSS systems are improved.285 
278 See DEP UAA, supra note 102, at 10. Based on EPA's 1994 CSO Policy, DEP considers 
this criterion to be met "when the costs of sewer separation are shown to be excessive, as 
compared to the water quality benefits to be achieved." [d. 
2'1!1 See supra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. 
211) DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 2-3. 
281 See FEIR CERTIFICATE, supra note 130, at 5. The Secretary of Environmental Affairs 
stated that MWRA's plan "makes good environmental and economic sense, given that achieving 
a swimmable/fishable Charles River by 2005 requires greater emphasis to be placed on the 
cost-efficient cleanup of non-CSO pollution sources in the basin, with a revisiting of the CSO 
issue in the future to see if further steps prove feasible at that time." [d. 
282 See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
21!3 See DEP CSO GUIDANCE, supra note 32, at 7. In considering the water quality benefits of 
sewer separation, the permittee should consider "potential interactive and overlapping pollution 
sources such as discharge from the storm drain system after separation .... " [d. 
284 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-82. 
286 See id.; see also Upper Chattahoochee Riverkeeper Fund, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 986 F. 
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As DEP explained in responding to public comments on its eso 
Policy, "[t]he focus of the alternatives analysis and cost-benefit analy-
sis is to effect eso controls that attain the highest water quality 
attainable while at the same time not expending public funds on eso 
controls that will result in little or no benefit to a receiving water.''286 
D. Absence of Clear Guidance 
According to EPA's own statements, while there is "extensive guid-
ance" supporting most of the regulatory requirements, "[n]one of this 
guidance, however, deals extensively with the economic considera-
tions.''287 To address this deficiency, EPA published an Economic Guid-
ance outlining a proposed method that states could use in calculating 
substantial and widespread social and economic impacts.288 However, 
the methodology outlined in this Guidance is not exclusive, and states 
are responsible for determining how and when substantial and wide-
spread social and economic impacts are shown.289 
VII. Two CONCLUSIONS, THE SAME RESULT: WHAT'S THE 
DIFFERENCE? 
A. A Successful Result for the Environment and Rate:payers 
Above all, EPA's approval of DEP's VAA, the promulgation of 
effective federal and state eso policies, MWRA's elimination of 
ninety-two percent of untreated esos, and treatment of ninety-two 
Supp. 1406, 1411 (N.D.Ga. 1997) (noting estimates of actual sewage content in CSOs to be 
between one and five percent). 
286 DEP, RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS 3 (Aug. 11, 1997) (regarding DEP Draft. CSO 
Policy) [hereinafter DEP RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS]. 
287 EPA ECONOMIC GUIDANCE, BU'JYf"a note 171, at cover letter. 
288 See id. 
289 See id. at 1-1, 1-11. 
This guidance is presented to assist States and EPA Regional Offices, along with other 
interested parties, in understanding the economic factors that may be considered, and 
the types of tests that can be used to determine: (1) if a designated use cannot be 
attained, (2) if a variance to an individual discharger can be granted, or (3) if degrada-
tion of high-quality water is warranted. The regulatory requirement that must be met 
is that attaining a designated use or obtaining a variance would result in substantial 
and widespread economic and social impacts. The regulatory requirement for antide-
gradation is that it must be shown that lower water quality is necessary to accommo-
date important social and economic development. This guidance provides a framework 
for making these considerations. 
Id. at cover letter (emphasis in original). 
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percent of continuing CSOs at two-thirds the original estimated price, 
illustrate the tremendous efforts and effectiveness of cooperation 
among EPA, DEP, and MWRA.290 By introducing cost considerations, 
however calculated, the ratepayers of Massachusetts avoid paying 
triple the expense for collection of only 0.4% of pollution.291 In view of 
the improbability of fishing and swimming during these discharge 
events and the non-CSO pollutants associated with such storm events 
such as overland flow, nonpoint sources, and ambient pollution from 
upstream sources, the solution does not significantly compromise the 
water quality goals of the CWA.292 
B. Contrast of Cost-Effectiveness with Traditional Cost-Benefit 
Analyses 
Cost-benefit considerations in any environmental regulations raise 
specters of concern among those who consider the preservation of 
irreplaceable natural resources the paramount national concern.293 
Even those who recognize the value of some cost-benefit analysis 
also recognize that these analyses often fail to quantify properly the 
benefits of a clean environment, which are far-reaching and not read-
ily quantifiable compared to the easily assessed costs to a regulated 
industry.294 Skeptics argue that a cost-benefit analysis artificially lim-
its alternatives, fails to compare the cost of not polluting versus the 
cost of clean up, and is susceptible to political pressure.295 Most impor-
tantly, cost-benefit detractors charge that this analysis is calculated 
in ignorance of the real intentions behind the regulations.296 All of 
these challenges are merited in most cost-benefit analyses, but are 
absent in the cost-effective analysis.297 
Unlike traditionally prescribed cost-benefit analyses which force 
the regulator to justify the regulation by quantifying the economic 
290 See discussion supra Sections III.A, V.B. 
291 See supra notes 202--05, 223 and accompanying text. 
292 See supra notes 280-81, 284-85. 
29.'1 See Richard A. Liroff, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Regulation: Will it Clear 
the Air or Muddy the Water?, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULA-
TIONS: POLITICS, ETHICS, AND METHODS 3 (1982). 
294 See Margot W. Garcia & Gregory A. Daneke, The Role of Public Involvement in Social 
Impact Assessment: Problems and Prospects, in PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT AND SOCIAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT 162 (Gregory A. Daneke et al., ed. 1983). 
295 See id. 
296 See NORMAN J. VIG & MICHAEL E. KRAFT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1990s 149 
(1990). 
297 See id. at 159-60; Liroff, supra note 293, at 3. 
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benefits of environmental improvement, the methods of DEP and 
EPA both presume a common goal: the attainment of WQSS.298 
Since DEP's analysis maintains the water quality goals, it is better 
characterized as a cost-effective method, finding ways to minimize the 
costs of achieving solid environmental goals.299 Cost-effective methods 
rely on costs only as a method of evaluating the best means of achiev-
ing a goal, not for defining the goal.3OO 
Since the goal of DEP and EPA plans is water quality benefits, the 
traditional offsetting of environmental benefit is not introduced.30l 
Instead, DEP's method merely introduces additional flexibility in ob-
taining that goal rather than focusing all available efforts on one type 
of discharge.302 
Varied environmental settings have shown the advantages of cost-
effective planning.303 Focused on attaining air and WQSs, a study 
found that implementation of cost-effective considerations by equal-
izing the marginal costs could save thirty to forty percent, with some 
sectors saving as much as ninety percent.304 Analysis of marginal costs 
has shown that some industries pay as much as thirty times the 
amounts paid by other industries to achieve the same pollutant abate-
ment.305 This is why many consider the introduction of cost-benefits 
"organized common sense."306 
298 See, e.g., Liroff, supra note 293, at 3; DEP RESPONSES TO PUBLIC COMMENTS, supra note 
280, at 3. DEP affirms that "[t]he overriding goal of CSO planning and the DEP Watershed 
Initiative is clean water, however, it needs to be understood that the instream water quality is 
dependent on controlling CSO and non-CSO sources of pollution." DEP RESPONSES TO PUBLIC 
COMMENTS, supra note 286, at 3. Therefore, according to DEP, "[t]he water quality impacts of 
the range of CSO controls is of critical importance in this regard and must be evaluated in the 
plan." Id. 
299 See VIG & KRAFT, supra note 296, at 146; Liroff, supra note 293, at 2-3. 
300 See VIG & KRAFT, supra note 296, at 153-54; Liroff, supra note 293, at 3. 
301 See Liroff, supra note 293, at 8 (discussing traditional criticism of cost-benefit analysis 
including the loss of focus on the purpose); supra note 298 and accompanying text. 
302 See supra note 289 and accompanying text. 
303 See VIG & KRAFT, supra note 296, at 153-54. 
304 See id. at 155. Marginal costs are the costs of achieving one unit of pollution abatement. 
See id. at 153-54. 
305 See id. at 154. 
306 Id. at 147; Raphael Kasper, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Decisionmaking, 45 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1013, 1014 (1977). 
At some point the feasibility of elimination is ruined because the costs are too high and 
the additional benefits too low .... Who but the most irrational among us could dis-
agree with the advantages of understanding (to some admittedly undefined extent) the 
costs and benefits of a proposed action and then using that understanding in making 
decisions. 
Kasper, supra, at 1014. 
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C. Advantages of DEP's Plan 
The principle advantage of the DEP system is that it incorporates 
all of EPA's Economic Guidance and adds an additional consideration 
of cost-effectiveness.307 This flexibility is particularly relevant in areas 
such as the Charles River, where it is widely suspected by state 
environmental officials that the majority of pollutants are from up-
stream sources and non-CSO stormwater discharges.30B In these situ-
ations, the water quality benefit will be virtually unaltered by addi-
tional CSO detention.309 For example, to reduce the CSO events from 
the Cottage Farm facility in Cambridge3lO from seven events per year 
to four would double the cost, yet only achieve a fifteen percent 
reduction in pollutant emissions such as biochemical oxygen demand 
and suspended solids.311 
Unfortunately, without the addition of a cost-effectiveness review, 
the EPA Guidance prescribes a minimum limit that must be spent in 
clean-up efforts, regardless of the resulting water quality benefits.312 
EPA's estimates established that total CSO control will be a multibil-
lion dollar venture.313 It is therefore unlikely that a CSS community 
could clean up CSOs without reaching the cap.314 Thus, while EPA's 
307 See DEP CSO POLICY, supra note 18, at 7. DEP's Policy notes that: 
[DEP] will make a finding that sewer separation will cause widespread social and 
economic impact when a project exceeds the affordability guidelines included in the 
EPA Economic Guidance far Water Quality Standards; or when costs are deter-
mined to be excessive when compared to water quality benefits to be achieved; or when 
alternative CSO controls are demonstrated to provide superior environmental benefits 
to a receiving water in supporting existing and proposed uses and associated water 
quality standards. 
Id. Since both DEP and EPA, therefore, include affordability in their reviews of infeasibility, 
an independent review of the advantages of considering affordability is unnecessary. See id. 
308 See Howe, supra note 215, at B3 ("State environmental officials increasingly think that the 
money that could be spent on increasing CSO control in the Charles could produce much bigger 
environmental benefits if spent, for example, to collect and treat river-bound runoff from city 
streets which can cause as much pollution as sewerage."); see also MCGHEE, supra note 3, at 
268 (noting that receiving bodies are so contaminated by runoff from the first flush of overland 
and stormwater flows that treatment of point sources appears unreasonable). 
309 See supra notes 151, 284-85 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 206-07 and accompanying text. 
311 See MWRA FEIR, supra note 2, at 25-82. 
312 See supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
313 See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
314 See supra notes 29, 261-65; see also Wheatiy, supra note 8, at 195 (raising social justice 
issues that only ''rich communities" will be able to afford the required improvements). Many 
cities have estimated CSO control costs higher than the amounts found by EPA to constitute 
widespread social and economic impacts in Boston. See Peter Crane Anderson, Note, The GSa 
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position is easier on ratepayers than no limitation, the fact remains 
that all residents in CSS communities should prepare to pay two 
percent of their income for these improvements.3l5 
While this reality is not overly burdensome, it fails to account for 
further expenditures.3l6 If the additional percentage of household in-
come in rates is a substantial economic and social harm now, what will 
it be in the future-certainly not less?3l7 Allowing the exemption for 
minimal benefit frees these funds for other environmental clean-up 
efforts, such as MWRA's efforts to address stormwater discharges, 
yielding a significant improvement in water quality at the same cost.31B 
However, the funds for these improvements must come at a cost in 
addition to MWRA's efforts.3l9 Thus, projected and unforeseen envi-
ronmental dangers not addressed by CSO abatement measures will 
have to come from a percentage of the ratepayers' income at a cost 
beyond the rate EPA considers a substantial economic and social 
impact.32o If instead, DEP's position replaces EPA's "afford ability" 
analysis in other communities, the CSO Control measures may be 
stopped short of the substantial impact rate while still achieving, as a 
percentage, large improvements-thus, leaving additional ratepayer 
resources for other environmental projects that would result in 
greater improvements in water quality per dollar spent.32l 
Sleeping Giant: Combined Sewer Overflow or Congressional Stalling Objective? 10 VA. ENVTL. 
L.J. 371, 394 (1991) (estimated CSO control costs, per capita: Rochester, New York-$3100; 
Richmond, Virginia-$3200; San Francisco, California-$1000). 
316 See supra notes 29, 267-71; see also Wheatly, supra note 8, at 195; Anderson, supra note 
314, at 394. 
316 See Liroff, supra note 293, at 8. 
317 For example, MWRA plans to spend $1.7 billion on improving drinking water quality. See 
MWRA, A Letter from Doug MacDonald Regarding Filtration for the MWRA Water Supply 
(visited Feb. 10, 1999) <http://www.mwra.state.ma.us/orglhtml/letter.htm>. The expenses, 
passed on to ratepayers, will add to the total burden and exceed the current rates. See id. Since 
EPA's review of sewer and water rates are combined in calculating the economic impacts, supra 
notes 254-55, these expenditures should be, and were, included in the impact analysis by EPA 
but do not appear as a consideration in EPA's Economic Guidance, supra note 178. See EPA 
Concurrence, supra note 135, at 1 (alluding to MWRA costs under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act). 
318 See Liroff, supra note 293, at 8; supra notes 280, 308 and accompanying text. 
319 See supra note 317 and accompanying text. 
320 See supra notes 266-77, 317 and accompanying text. 
321 See supra notes 151, 280, 284-85, 308 and accompanying text; see also VIG & KRAFT, supra 
note 296, at 146 (describing a failure to consider the most cost-effective means of achieving a 
set environmental goal as "wasteful"); Liroff, supra note 293, at 2-3 (noting that one view of 
cost-effectiveness in environmental decisionmaking is that it protects "scarce public resources"). 
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D. Revisiting Consensus 
Regardless of the benefit of considering cost-effectiveness, EPA 
recognizes the need to clarify its analysis for other communities.322 As 
DEP points out in its responses to EPA's initial assertions on this 
issue, permit applicants are investing millions of dollars just in plan-
ning these expenditures.323 Especially with MWRA, which has bur-
dened its ratepayers with high cost increases as part of the Boston 
Harbor cleanup,324 the need to plan in advance to make the most 
efficient use of its income has a huge impact on public perception of 
environmental cleanups and the willingness of the public to put up 
with environmental regulations and the trickle down (or flood) of 
costS.325 By clarifying its position, EPA has taken a big step in mini-
mizing CSO abatement costS.326 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment does not suggest that the efforts of MWRA, EPA, 
and DEP regarding the Boston areas have been unproductive. To the 
contrary, the success of these efforts is laudable. The lingering prob-
lem is in synchronizing the remaining state WQSs and CSO policies 
in a manner that cleans up the watersheds from CSO pollution but 
reflects the realties of the limited economic resources-allocating re-
sources among the competing projects in a way that achieves the 
greatest benefit per dollar spent. 
322 See EPA Concurrence, supra note 135, at 2. 
323 See DEP Response to EPA, supra note 151, at 1 (noting that ''regulated entities have based 
CSO design plans costing millions of dollars" in reliance on EPA's earlier support of DEP's 
position). 
324 See Boston Harbor: Cost Projections Slashed for Harbor Cleanup, GREENWIRE, Sept. 9, 
1994, at Sect. Air and Water Pollution ("The court-ordered cleanup has already caused MWRA 
customers to pay some of the highest water and sewer bills in the country."); Allen, supra note 
180, at 25 ("MWRA customers ... already pay among the highest water and sewer bills in the 
country because of the court-ordered harbor cleanup. The average MWRA water and sewer 
customer pays $590 a year in service charges, an amount expected to rise 50 to 75 percent by 
1999."). 
325 See, e.g., Chacon, supra note 188, at 22. Vice President Al Gore reacting to the MWRA plan 
stated, "[t]his is a workable plan to make the city's water safer and cleaner and to reduce 
people's water bills." [d. John DeVillars, regional administrator for EPA, also stated that the 
MWRA plan was "an Earth Day present from the administration to the beach-goers and 
ratepayers around Boston." [d. 
326 See supra note 323 and accompanying text. 
